'All of Us are Looking Forward to Leaving':

The Censored Correspondence of the

Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France,

1917–18 by Ribeiro De Meneses, Filipe
‘All of Us are Looking Forward to Leaving’:
The Censored Correspondence of the
Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France,
1917–18
The lack of morale among the Portuguese forces fighting on the
Western Front — and its link with the collapse of the Portuguese
2nd Division on 9 April 1918, before one of the most successful
German offensives of the war — has already been demonstrated.1
Even if only for one morning, the Portuguese Expeditionary
Corps (CEP), at the battle on the Lys river, found itself in the
centre of the fighting in Europe, thus accomplishing the objective
so desired by the politicians who had initially sent it to France.
However, difficulties with supplies and reinforcements, political
divisions, and a violent change of government in Lisbon in
December 1917 had all contributed to the CEP’s inability to
mount a co-ordinated defence against the German onslaught,
which was both preceded by a sudden and violent artillery 
barrage and spearheaded by the shock-troops developed by
Hindenburg and Ludendorff. After 9 April 1918 the remains of
the CEP were used by the Allies in secondary duties, including
the digging of trenches. Some combat-worthy battalions were
assembled, but returned to the front only in November 1918, too
late to see any fighting. The Portuguese experience of the
Western Front, despite the small size of the CEP (an incomplete
army corps), is of interest to historians of the Great War because
it provides a unique perspective of that conflict: for Portugal the
war was a limited, and not a total, war against a distant enemy;
there was no consensus in Portugal over the need to send an
expeditionary corps to France or even, among a significant and
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vocal minority, to be at war with Germany.2 Moreover, the
Portuguese army reflected this lack of consensus, a substantial
part of its officers believing the country’s intervention to have
been the result of partisan policy, born out of the material and
political interests of a few, and not of national necessity. Finally,
the CEP was, in its social and cultural composition, an exception
on the Western Front (although not in the war as a whole, con-
sidering the campaigns in Eastern Europe): as an example of a
largely rural and illiterate population, whose experience of 
war was limited to African campaigns, it naturally faced greater
difficulties than its Allied counterparts in adjusting to the mass
industrial battlefields of France.
Measuring the attitude of the Portuguese army during its time
in France is not easy. Because of different political opinions, split
essentially between, on the one hand, the monarchist and con-
servative republican and, on the other, the radical republican,
officers interpreted their presence in France in very different
ways — for some it was a needless sacrifice imposed by a dema-
gogical clique while for others it was a bold and welcome 
departure in Portugal’s history. This fundamental disagreement
over the meaning of the war resulted in a divided memory of
events, and comparatively few accounts and memoirs of the
fighting were published in the postwar years: most of these, in
any case, were the product of politically engaged men writing for
clearly identifiable commercial or political reasons, or of officers
trying hard to leave politics out of the CEP’s story in an effort to
focus attention on its tribulations and sacrifices.3 Moreover, a
virtual blanket of silence engulfed Portugal’s war experience
under Salazar’s New State: for the Portuguese Right the war had
been a catastrophe brought upon the country by the oversized
ambition of a divided, corrupt, and intolerant republican political
leadership. The official discourse on the subject of Portuguese
participation in the conflict, initially sketched by Sidónio Pais in
1918, was limited to expressions of admiration for the men who,
sent to fight in France for unclear reasons, had done so much to
uphold Portuguese honour and the country’s martial reputation:
no further meaning was attached to the country’s war experi-
ence.4 In order to gauge the true opinions of Portuguese soldiers
and officers in France, one must look for wartime accounts of life
in the trenches by the members of the CEP. Some of these can be
found in the soldiers’ wartime correspondence, a historical
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source already employed extensively in relation to other armies
by historians of the Great War. 
A number of methodological problems arise from this source,
some of them specific to the Portuguese case. In the first place,
the Portuguese army, unlike its counterparts on the Western
Front, was largely illiterate. Seventy per cent of the adult popula-
tion in Portugal could not read or write: and while the proportion
of illiterate women was higher than that of men, the overwhelm-
ingly rural (which, in Portugal’s case, meant uneducated) nature
of the Portuguese infantry ensured that the percentage of illiter-
ates in the CEP made it an oddity on the Western Front. The 
volume of correspondence generated by the CEP was therefore
smaller than that of other Allied army corps, and the need to have
other soldiers write letters (and to have someone in Portugal read
the letters to the intended audience) may well have had an impact
on the nature of the correspondence above and beyond the usual
constraints of wartime letters — the presence of the censor and
the desire to ease the anxiety of loved ones. Another problem that
arises is the very real lack of collections of correspondence; the
most significant is to be found in the Arquivo Histórico Militar
(AHM) in Lisbon, and consists of correspondence intercepted by
the army’s postal censorship service. This fact is not without 
consequences: the material for this article is a collection of letters
which the Army prevented from arriving at their destinations pre-
cisely because they were detrimental to civilian morale. It is
impossible to judge what percentage of the CEP’s total corre-
spondence was halted, and what percentage of halted correspond-
ence has survived in the Army’s archives. However, because we
are starting from the principle that morale was poor — as is evi-
denced by a number of impartial witnesses,5 and readily admitted
by the CEP’s commanders themselves — the intercepted corre-
spondence can help us to explain the nature of the problems that
afflicted the soldiers and undermined their morale.
What were the difficulties that preoccupied Portugal’s soldiers
as they lived and fought in the trenches of Flanders, surrounded
on both sides by their ‘historic’ British allies? The most apparent,
from their intercepted correspondence, was the impossibility of
leave. Portuguese soldiers could not go on leave: whether this
was the result of very real transport difficulties,6 or of a fear that
soldiers on leave would not return and would act as a source of
detrimental stories about the war, is not clear. The fact that the
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Portuguese soldiers were in close contact with British forces,
whose members enjoyed the benefits of home leave, was signifi-
cant. Whatever the reason, leave was only available for officers,
in what was a tremendous blow for morale, especially since many
of the officers who went on leave after 5 December 1917 simply
did not return to France.7 The government of Sidónio Pais,
formed after the coup which had toppled the interventionist
Sacred Union government of Afonso Costa, allowed officers to
remain in Portugal indefinitely, while their troops endured the
rigours of the French winter. 
The policy of denying leave to the soldiers of the CEP was
never altered until the end of the war; many soldiers would be
repatriated by Sidónio Pais in 1918 — the wounded and infirm —
but this was not part of a system of leave, or even of the replace-
ment of unfit men; rather, it was a part of Sidónio Pais’s attempt
to reduce the scale of Portugal’s involvement in the conflict,
thereby increasing his domestic popularity. The stored corre-
spondence suggests that, naturally, the soldiers were consumed
by thoughts of home and the elaboration of stratagems for return-
ing safely to their country. J. Esgalha, writing to his family from
England, where he was undergoing instruction, asked his father
to arrange his return to Portugal through a doctor at the Estrela
military hospital in Lisbon who negotiated the recall of soldiers
from the front: ‘Many boys, who are as healthy as I, are being let
go by the medical board; just today five left my company for
Portugal and many have been let go.’8 Francisco Rodrigues
Marques wrote to a fellow soldier to inform him of a doctor 
who might be able to arrange for an early return to Portugal.9
Casimiro Pinto, writing to what seems to have been a ‘War
Godmother’, told her that leave was impossible, being availed 
of by only a handful of officers: it was rumoured, he added opti-
mistically, that his Division would soon be replaced by another
formation and that as a result there would be no need for leave.10
António Correia was meant to have received an anonymous 
letter from his son at the front, who had hatched a plot to ensure
his return to Portugal: along with a false mass card, the soldier
would receive from his father the sad news of the ‘demise’ of his
grandmother, along with a request to be present at the reading of
the will: without his presence, no arrangements could be made.11
The ultimate plot was hatched by Custódio, who wrote to his
wife to tell her of the details:
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As I am sick of all this I had an idea for going on leave and never returning
here. Ask Isabel to write me a letter saying that you have pneumonia and that
the doctor says you will not make it because you’re anaemic and it’s a double
pneumonia: that our children are at her house and that Adélia has gone mad,
and that, poor as we are, though it may be difficult to admit it, she asks me to
go to Lisbon to take care of the children before some tragedy occurs . . . She
should tell me all the time that your condition is getting worse, that you are
constantly calling for me and that the girls are crying, that you are constantly
worse.12
One soldier, writing to a friend, recommended asking for a
doctor’s appointment and eating a bar of soap fifteen minutes
before meeting the doctor as a way out of the trenches.13
Lack of leave was indeed a serious problem for the men of the
CEP, who, if uninjured or in good health, simply did not have a
glimmer of hope for returning home safely until the war ended.
Thoughts of revolt were entertained as a result of this condition.
A letter sent in the civilian post by a soldier, Serafim Fernandes
Leite, to his parents, mentioned the possibility of a mass de-
sertion to the Germans if the troops were returned to the trenches
before a spell of leave, which seemed to be reserved for officers,
for whom the war had been a holiday — in his words, ‘a Brazil’.14
An anonymous letter, full of spelling errors, was sent to the
Commander in Chief of the CEP, General Tamagnini d’Abreu,
informing him that his men felt abandoned in France, and that
one day he might find the Portuguese Division on the side of the
Germans: he was asked to choose between sending his men home
on leave or watching them cross no man’s land to the German
trenches.15 The personal despair of Alves Mendes Cabral as he
wrote to his wife was clear: 
I’m the same as ever, always hoping for some order that will send us back to
Portugal, but as far as I can see it’s all fantasy, because those who are here stay
here, lucky are those who are in Portugal because those of us in France might
as well give up our intentions of returning because we’ve been here for nearly
sixteen months and there is no glimmer of hope, only the hope of losing our
life.16
António Pereira da Silva explained, to an acquaintance, the
reason for another man’s leave and not his own: ‘Mr Fonseca was
luckier when it came to leave and it is not surprising because he is
an officer and I am a soldier,’ adding that ‘he is still there
[Portugal] and I will only go later or never.’17 However, even
among NCOs and officers there was discontent over the matter
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of leave. Captain Mattos Raymundo was such an officer; writing
in December 1917 (he had heard of disturbances in Lisbon and
Oporto but definite news of the overthrow of the government had
not reached him yet) he complained that only the General and
officers who were also parliamentary deputies had left for
Lisbon: ‘The moral is this: some are at the front, and do not enjoy
the benefits to which they are entitled, while the shirkers have
everything, they lack nothing and enjoy their leave like lords.’18
Second Lieutenant Teixeira Moniz warned his father, in March
1918, that there were many officers ahead of him in the queue for
leave, and that by his calculation leave would only be granted in
August or September of that year: ‘What I need is a great rest, far
from all the problems of the war where for a while I will not hear
of soldiers nor be bothered by them!’19 Another Second Lieu-
tenant, Santos Pedroso, wrote to his fiancée ‘over here nobody
seems to care about leave, nobody speaks about it any more. As
those gentlemen have already gone on leave a couple of times,
they do not care about those who, like me, have never had such a
pleasure.’20 Two days later he returned to the same subject: 
As regards leave I know nothing and I don’t think that there is anything to be
known over here — what about at that end? Do you know anything yet? Oh!
How I would like to go on leave, to see you and embrace you! At that moment
I would be the happiest creature in the world, I swear! But it is too much 
happiness for us, and I’m sure that it will not be this month that we will know
that happiness. Time marches on and nobody cares! The way these people act
is criminal!21
Sergeant José dos Santos, who maintained a carefully num-
bered correspondence with his wife, found it hard to assuage her
feeling of anger over leave: 
You say, sweetheart, that in relation to the martyrdom of our absence what
most upsets you is seeing all the others return and only me staying on. You 
cannot imagine how all of that upsets me; as you well know I’m not here for the
simple pleasure of being in France. If I had been able and allowed to do so I
would have left a long time ago, because I’m only too sick of all of this.22
Also related to the problem of leave was the sudden rumour
among soldiers that leave could be purchased: with 300 francs
the much desired passage home could be secured. This was the
message of Francisco de Jesus to his mother in August 1918: his
mother sent him little money, his daily wages (10 cents) did not
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allow him even to buy an apple, and with 300 francs he could
arrange for the leave — otherwise he would have to wait until the
end of the war.23 A soldier, in an unsigned letter, wrote to his
father in the Algarve, complaining that while other soldiers were
returning to Portugal, he simply did not have the necessary 300
francs.24 Soldier Mateus Rodrigues attempted to blackmail his
mother: either she sent him the money necessary to purchase the
leave (which his officer had assured him would come soon) or he
would have to marry a French woman, ‘one of those with many
Francs’: otherwise he would never return to Portugal, ‘because
the war will never end’.25 Armando Martins, a patriotic soldier
embarrassed by the use of the Portuguese troops as trench 
diggers in the aftermath of 9 April 1918, stated in relation to
leave that ‘we have been fooled by a thousand promises’.26 As the
war entered its last weeks an American, W.E. Vanderbilt, of the
American Red Triangle association, wrote his wife a letter that
passed through the hands of the Portuguese postal censorship,
and which was transcribed for the benefit of the CEP’s com-
manders. According to Vanderbilt, the Portuguese soldiers,
‘farmer boys and from the small towns’, did not know why they
were at war and why they were being made to spend such a long
time away from their homes: ‘They say they will be entirely will-
ing to return here and go on with the fight after this short vaca-
tion.’ Vanderbilt felt confident, nevertheless, that his words of
encouragement had been positively received by the Portuguese:
in a Spanish learned in Mexico he pointed out to them that ‘they
are not as badly off as the Canadians, the New Zealanders and
the Australians, many of whom have now been away from home
for three years and more’,27 thus ignoring the fact that, unlike 
the soldiers from the Dominions, Portuguese soldiers had not
volunteered their presence in France.
If a desire to return home, whether definitively or on leave, was
a common theme in the censored letters of the Portuguese army,
then the conditions endured at the front were also another
frequent source of complaint among the soldiers. Among these
the amount and quality of the food served to the men stood out.
José Rosa dos Santos complained about the food at length to his
wife in Lisbon: it was mostly tinned food, but frequently it was
inedible: ‘Today was one of those days in which the whole meal
was rotten.’ Limited solace was to be found in the bread, which
was of good quality, but available only in limited quantities: 
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There is only one loaf for every three men, for the past three days I’ve only
eaten one fourth of a loaf, if things continue like this then, if I am ever to know
the joy of returning to Lisbon, I will have to go to the Rego Hospital, this is too
much, the only thing missing here is the plague . . . on top of all of this unhappi-
ness we have to work by night, with our bellies full of hunger.28
Chaplain J. Manuel de Sousa praised the courage of the
Portuguese soldiers despite the fact that they were ‘tired, their
strength exhausted, ill, burdened by all kinds of problems, badly
clothed and fed worse still’.29 This admission led to an internal
enquiry into the chaplain, who was defended by his superior in a
letter of 5 March 1918: ‘Father Sousa is a venerable priest of 59
years of age who, by stepping forward as a volunteer chaplain,
proved that his soul is full of dedication for the cause of the
Fatherland.’30 Mateus Rodrigues attempted to depress his mother
further by letting her know that in the aftermath of the battle of
the Lys he had spent five days without eating; he was now much
better off, however, working in a luggage deposit in the vicinity
of which the soldiers had grown vegetables: ‘we have eaten many
times salad of lettuce and beans and peppers and cucumbers, 
not to mention cabbages, which are huge here’.31 António da
Purificação’s fate was different: employed as a trench digger in
July 1918, he wrote to his mother saying that ‘we’re dead with
hunger, I don’t know how we resist, a loaf is divided up between
six and eight men’.32 A letter signed simply Arnaldo, written on 3
February 1918, stated that the officers treated the soldiers like
dogs, starving them and intercepting the food packages sent by
the Portuguese Women’s Crusade, whose contents they kept for
themselves; if soldiers wanted something to eat, they had to 
buy it.33 Even before the Lys battle a soldier presented a heart-
breaking picture of deprivation to his wife: 
I have even offered 10 francs for a piece of bread and been rejected . . . they
give a loaf of bread for every twelve men, (no more than) a mouthful each, so
we do the following: the 12 get together and carry out a draw, and so whoever
wins keeps the loaf, the winner can fill himself up with bread. From this you
can see everything.34
Similar to the complaints about the lack of food were the com-
plaints about the Flanders weather, so different from Portugal’s
more benign clime. Second Lieutenant Luís de Souza Gonzaga,
seeking a Brazilian war godmother, described France as ‘cold
and icy as the flowers on a tomb’.35 Less poetic, but more symp-
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tomatic of the difficulties experienced by Portuguese veterans of
other wars, were the words of Second Lieutenant Simões dos
Santos, writing to an officer stationed in Africa, in July 1917,
presumably one of the hottest months that year in France: ‘It is
very cold here and used to the African climate as I am I will not
be able to withstand, even if I am not caught by the bullets, 20
degrees below zero!’36 As we saw already, Father J. Manuel de
Sousa, describing the soldiers under his spiritual charge, claimed
that they were inadequately dressed for the winter: and he him-
self had suffered heavily from the bitter effects of the cold during
the early months of the year.37 Mateus Rodrigues continued his
litany of woes by claiming that in the aftermath of the Lys battle
he had gone for 22 days without being issued a blanket, sleeping
on the ground despite the inclement weather, and with only one
uniform; everything else had been left behind in the rout.38
The actual description, for the benefit of those at home, of the
fighting in an age of brutal industrialized warfare was also a 
concern of the troops, although, as many studies of correspond-
ence have shown, this desire for comprehension was often
matched by the need to preserve loved ones from the horrible
reality of the Western Front. Moreover, descriptions of the fight-
ing were frowned upon by the military authorities, always careful
not to allow military information to pass into unsure hands.
Nevertheless, in the AHM’s censored correspondence we find
some attempts to translate the horror of war into a language
understood by the civilians in Portugal, so far removed geo-
graphically and culturally from what the soldiers were going
through. Pride of place would go to the Lys battle, the one
moment in which the CEP was caught in the full fury of war,
confronted by a deadly and accurate artillery barrage and by an
attack carried out in accordance with the new infantry tactics of
the German army. For the survivors of 9 April 1918 the Lys
battle would remain at the heart of their war experience, the day
in which the memory of the fallen should be commemorated —
which suggests that to the veterans, or to those who spoke in their
name, the sacrifice of the troops was more important than partici-
pation in the final victory. An anonymous letter written on 6
October 1917 left no doubt as to the grim reality facing the 
soldiers: ‘All of us are looking forward to leaving. We’ve been
here 5 months and it seems like 5 years. Imagine that in 5 
minutes the gas kills a man, provoking the most horrible pains.’
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The anonymous correspondent then attempted to explain the
concept of trench warfare: ‘Here no advances are made. Those
who try to do so lose all their men as a result of the mines which
the enemy explodes: we have mines under their trenches and they
have mines under ours.’ He continued, 
This is what trench warfare comes down to: artillery attacks, gas, raids to cut
each other’s wire, and the machine guns constantly firing to stop the enemy,
mortars that bury a live man and every once in a while half a dozen are killed,
and this is how we spend our days until our turn comes.39
Francisco Simões dos Santos, as a junior officer, bemoaned the
fate of those who held similar ranks: 
It would be better to be a sergeant and live than to be a dead Second
Lieutenant. By my calculations only 5% of the Second Lieutenants will make it
out of this war; 50% will die and the remaining 45% will be mutilees. This is
indeed the ‘war of the Second Lieutenants’! And while the Lieutenants and the
Captains have 90% probability of making it, the Second Lieutenants have 5%,
as I’ve already said.40
A letter by another Second Lieutenant, Henrique Ernesto
Teixeira Moniz, provides clear proof of the tension felt by those
at the front to inform, in order to be pitied, and at the same time
to preserve families from the horrors of war. Replying to his
father’s complaint about the lack of concrete information about
life at the front (or as the young officer called it, ‘these horrible
lands of France’), Teixeira Moniz asked
Why should I sadden you even more, and have you continuously worried? Can
they not be left to myself, my sadness and these bitter tastes in my mouth? Why
should I worry you with my tales, filled as they are with fears, privations and
shocks?41
Although he would like to tell his father of life in the trenches,
Teixeira Moniz claimed that he would prefer to wait until he was
home, safe once again. Slowly, however, his account was made:
so far there had been little fighting in his sector, but already he
had witnessed the carnage of the war: 
I tell you frankly, my dear and missed father, that I have never been through
anything similar, and God willing I never will again! Nothing can be compared
to it; one cannot have even the slightest idea of it! A horrible thing! Seeing
death a number of times, hearing and seeing the enemy shells bursting a few
342 European History Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3
02_Articles 30/3  6/6/00 10:16 am  Page 342
metres away, seeing my soldiers fall dead next to me, killed by the shrapnel of
the bursting shells; the confusion of the moment itself, for someone who is
entering a trench for the very first time, is a horrible thing; one cannot make the
smallest idea of it.42
Despite Teixeira Moniz’s stated desire to preserve his father
from the worst, the desire to let him know what the trenches were
like reasserted itself: 
Hearing the shells whistle and burst near me has happened many times. One
could even call it our daily bread, and I have grown used to them. We get used
to this, and after a while we no longer care about it. In any case, all we can do is
to see more or less where they are landing and run to either one side or the other
in order to get as far away from them as possible. The war, this damned war!43
Teixeira Moniz, finally, pointed out how close they were to the
enemy: the lines were never further than 150 metres away, and
sometimes they were as close as 50 metres: ‘And this is where we
spend our best days, our youth!’44
A heroic account of the Lys battle was provided by Second
Sergeant João C. da Costa, writing under the pseudonym of
Evangelista. In this account the Portuguese line held while the
British forces which flanked the CEP gave way, provoking the
Portuguese retreat. Speaking of his sector, Evangelista told of
three attacks which were beaten back despite being preceded by
shells and mortars. ‘The attack began at 4:15 and only at 10
o’clock did our line break!! Heroic soldiers: 90% of your 
numbers fell, but the honour of Portugal is saved!! You died, 
soldier from Minho, but you died heroically . . . may the earth not
weigh you down.’ Evangelista then enumerated the reasons for
the impossibility of holding out any longer: 
We were one against ten; we were tired and demoralized from the long stay at
the front; we were betrayed by the munitions, which ran out a few hours into
the fight — both infantry and artillery; we put up with over 60,000 gas shells;
communications were cut right from the start; due to the artillery barrage it was
impossible to move up the division’s reserves quickly enough; the officers were
killed, there being thus no superior direction; for all these reasons we
Portuguese did not hold out, but nobody — absolutely nobody — held out.45
The final act of Portuguese heroism came with the realization
that the battle was lost: 
Portuguese officers resisted and died; the majority of those who while resisting
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realized that they, while not being able to triumph, still had their lives, and that
those lives would be spent interned in the enemy’s concentration camps 
for prisoners, remained heroes to the end — that is, better death than being a
prisoner: they committed suicide . . . a Portuguese battalion (Inf.15), being out
of munitions, carried out a bayonet charge! Not a single man survived.46
According to the letter, 11,000 men had missed the most recent
roll call of the Division. The scale of losses was indeed impres-
sive. Second Lieutenant Joaquim Ribeiro, from the safety of the
Grand Hotel du Louvre et Terminus in Boulogne-sur-mer, wrote
that ‘entire battalions, entire artillery groups were left there, 
miserably abandoned by the command, which survived. They
died, but with glory.’47 Francisco de Jesus gave a more colourful
description of the fighting, in which, as he wrote to his mother, he
had nearly been taken prisoner: ‘There was so much firing and it
was so thick that it was like the winter rain there.’48 Informing his
mother that from their region only he and another soldier had
made it through the battle, Francisco de Jesus asked her to tell
him if she, in Portugal, had heard news of their acquaintances at
the front or if their families were now receiving a pension. The
scale of losses had obviously impressed this soldier: ‘over 16 
million men — just counting the Portuguese — were killed, those
killed of other nations were countless, gas shells are best not 
spoken of, there were many and I did not have a mask to wear
and I was caught by some gas.’49 A more realistic — but still 
grossly inflated — estimate of the casualties and Portuguese
resistance was given by António da Purificação, whose ‘good
fortune’ it was to be in hospital on 9 April. According to him the
Lys battle had lasted for 8 days and there had been 5,000 killed
and 13,000 prisoners taken.50
While Evangelista’s account of the Lys battle was one of an
epic struggle between Germans and outnumbered Portuguese,
Mateus Rodrigues’s narrative was one of self-preservation in the
face of a terrifying ordeal. The German shelling, which began at
four, found Rodrigues ‘very peaceful in my bed’: and it seemed
to Mateus Rodrigues that Judgement Day had arrived.51 On 9
April most of the 2nd Division was destroyed on the battlefield.
Rodrigues and a few men made a judgement to withdraw in the
face of the shelling and the German advance, unlike anything
they’d experienced before — but still found themselves in the
fighting: 
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I, to see if I could escape from the enemy’s fire, leaned against a wall of a hotel,
and there a few minutes were spent, but when I heard the bullets of the enemy’s
rifles and machine-guns I said boys, today will be our end but we should not
run away because those who run away are also shot, running away will not help
us, today its down to luck, may God give us luck, only God can help us.
Rodrigues and his party of stragglers were rescued by the
prompt arrival of British and Australian troops, but his personal
retreat continued, reaching the rear lines — ‘Village Paradis’ —
only to be shelled again: there were a number of casualties, but
he could not say how many because he was on the move again: 
As soon as I saw it land I retreated to a field on my left and then another one
came from the same direction and landed further forward, really close to me, it
was my good fortune that it did not explode because otherwise it would have
been the end of me, but my guardian angel was keeping me company along
with the Good Lord and Holy Mary.52
Also interesting were accounts of aerial bombardment, an
experience for which some of the soldiers were clearly not pre-
pared and which they struggled to convey to their home audi-
ence. Arnaldo Lopes Ribeiro strove to find a comparison: ‘On
the day of the September holiday, while you were all at the
dances, listening to the music and enjoying yourselves I was here
racked with worry for the bombs were bursting very close to me,
they were louder than the holiday fireworks.’53 Ribeiro’s bitter-
ness quickly turned to despair: ‘One cannot live like this, if I ever
find myself there [in Portugal] nobody will be able to take me
away.’ Another letter, signed only Arnaldo, sent the next day,
stated that there were entire cities destroyed by the bombard-
ments, which ‘kill children, kill women, kill civilian men: be they
guilty or innocent, they all die. This is very sad, don’t you think,
daughter? This is a complete horror.’54 Adriano dos Santos’s
description of events in Calais was equally demoralizing: ‘This is
horrible. This city is bombed by enemy aircraft, these are aero-
planes that travel through the air but drop on us below bombs
called aerial torpedoes. I can’t begin to tell you — where these
bombs fall they destroy everything.’55 The effects were indeed
devastating: ‘It is pitiful to see so many buildings pulled down
and so many children and women, so many people, killed by the
bombs. One cannot live like this; it is such a sad situation that I
don’t know what will befall me and my comrades.’56 Writing later
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in 1918, Manuel Martinho showed a certain amount of contempt
for the bombs: ‘The biggest danger for me are the aeroplanes,
which every night attack the city where I am posted; this city is
called Havre. At the start I was very afraid when we were
bombed, but today nothing scares me: I have seen so much that
nothing amazes me.’57 Martinho then attempted to describe the
scenes that occurred during an attack: ‘The bombardment con-
tinues! What to do? “Run away!” To run away is to be brave.
Where is the bed? I don’t know, forward is the only way . . . 10
minutes later someone reaches me and says: “the church has
been knocked down, and we have to withdraw.” Mother, you can
imagine the night that lies ahead of me.’58
That there should be criticism of the CEP and its organization
was not surprising, considering the frequent shortages of sup-
plies, the lack of reinforcements, and the divisive political cli-
mate within its units. Some officers tried to distance themselves
from the rest of the Army, maintaining a critical stance that
revealed a deep hostility to the mission they were being asked to
perform, seeing in the CEP not an agent for the affirmation of
Portugal and its republican regime but merely an expensive and
dangerous waste of resources and time. This attitude can be
found in many letters sent by officers but nevertheless appre-
hended by the army’s censorship service. Lieutenant António
Vaz Monteiro Gomes was appalled by the sight of his country-
men at the front. ‘I was up North, where alongside the organiza-
tion, method, order, and cleanliness of the English and the 
colonial troops I had the occasion to see for myself the chaos,
lack of method, and dirtiness of our people, especially of the 
officers.’59 These officers, who had looked their best on the
Parisian boulevards, now wore greasy uniforms and three-day
beards; and their headquarters was described as ‘a nest of 
shirkers and pedants, who criticise everything, but with a criti-
cism wherein was noticeable only the envy that insults and not
the stimulus to improve’. Monteiro Gomes added that his only
consolation was that while the soldiers were as dirty as the 
officers — ‘dirtier would be impossible’ — they were nevertheless
much more interesting, ‘less full of themselves’.60 Eugénio de
Morais complained above all about the delays in the mail: 
‘imagine: some of my letters have taken two months to arrive!
One would think we were in Timor! Portuguese postal services
abroad — we know what they’re like. All these shirkers spend their
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days in different towns enjoying themselves with whores and business
will take care of itself.’61 He then drew a comparison between the
CEP and the surrounding British troops, which extended to the
way in which the war was seen by the two armies: 
We’re the ones who suffer, we who command troops, we who spend day and
night in these decrepit and badly separated trenches, badly fed, badly clothed,
badly . . . bad. I will explain one day. The English, they have everything in
abundance, and because it’s their war, they are all happy and satisfied, despite
dropping like flies. 
The implication of his words, of course, was that the war was
not a Portuguese affair; moreover, he could not see how victory
might come about: 
Everyone wants peace, except all the English. But the truth is that we have the
whole of Europe fighting the Boche, and the English still had to call upon the
Senegalese and the Australians. We have Indians, now we have Americans, in
other words troops from all over the world. Well, let me tell you, my friend, by
force of arms alone the Boche will not be beaten, not even by the whole world!62 
Captain Mattos Raymundo, worried about the question of
leave, thought that this applied only to the shirkers behind the
lines.63 These views were shared by Second Lieutenant Santos
Pedroso. Those behind the lines had gone twice to Lisbon, so
they did not care about the officers in the front: ‘if there really
was divine justice, many would already have been punished —
and well punished — so great are the infringements that have
been carried out’.64
This lack of esprit de corps was a characteristic of the CEP,
driven apart by the political differences of its officers. Adelino
Frazão, a monarchist (in fact a supporter of the proscribed
Miguelista branch of the Portuguese royal family, exiled in
Austria), poured out his scorn for the interventionists, who ‘tire
themselves out in the various bases, valorously battling against
French women, and spreading dishonourable rumours about the
comrades at the front to justify their cowardice’. Arguing that
senior officers never appeared in the trenches, Frazão concluded
that it was the subalterns in the trenches who were bearing the
brunt of the fighting: ‘Have you heard of a post commander 
mentioned in despatches? I have not. All of this is the fault of 
this damned politics that here, as in Portugal, continues to 
ruin everything.’65 The massive change in politics that resulted
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from Sidónio Pais’s coup — which had dramatic effects for the
CEP — was reflected in correspondence. Second Lieutenant
João Herculano de Moura, part of General Gomes da Costa’s
staff, chose not to accompany the General on his return to
Portugal in June 1918; to one of his correspondents he wrote,
‘according to people who arrive from Lisbon, things there are
really stupid’;66 to his mother he wrote ‘I’m staying here because
from what I hear the weather in Lisbon will surely harm my
nerves.’67 Sergeant José dos Santos, after complaining to his 
wife of the leave arrangements, sought to account for the CEP’s
failure: 
What has happened here is shameful and it destroys the morale of those who
love their Fatherland and call themselves Portuguese. And who is to blame?
I’m sure that you are well aware! . . . We, who in this conflict and this terrible
war might have filled History with pages of gold and diamonds, have done the
complete opposite. And who is to blame? Those who claim to govern us? Yes,
maybe they and only they are most responsible for everything.68
More positive were the views of an army chaplain, Father José
Parente. Writing to his brother, who served in an artillery unit,
Father José asked, ‘and what say you to the Portuguese revolu-
tion and the arrest of the demagogues? There is no need to tell
you that satisfaction with the success of the 8 December move-
ment was general. May God illuminate our new leaders so that
they may raise Portugal from the degrading state that it was in.’
Father José went on to add that the situation was not yet safe in
Portugal: ‘everyone says that one can now breathe peacefully
there, but that the ‘ant’ still seems to want to move’.69
The letters to be found in the AHM in Lisbon, although limited
in number and grouped as a unit precisely because they had been
censored, nevertheless provide unique insight into the failings of
the CEP, a force undone by politics and cultural differences even
as it set off from Portugal in 1917. The letters illustrate vividly
the lack of unity, morale, and common purpose of the officers,
NCOs, and soldiers who composed the Portuguese army in
France: the splits in the officer class are especially significant,
with monarchists, republicans, and the sympathizers of Sidónio
Pais struggling to provide the experience in France with a mean-
ing. These splits and the organized guerrilla they generated added
to the exasperation felt by the men, who endured terrible con-
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ditions for which they were not prepared, without the leadership
and example of unity they needed in order to be sure that their
sacrifice was of value. It was not surprising that mutinies would
greet the attempts by officers committed to the CEP’s mission to
raise combat-worthy units from the remains of the 9 April 1918
battle, thereby returning elements of the Portuguese army to the
battle front. For all of its obvious interest, however, censored
correspondence did not attract the systematic attention of the
Army — it was never used methodically as a source of intelli-
gence regarding the needs and morale of the troops. The politi-
cally sensitive nature of the CEP’s mission, and the impossibility
of maintaining secrecy in its politically divided midst, might be
one reason for this failure; the ad hoc nature of much of the
CEP’s organization might be another, and simpler, explanation
for this oversight, so damaging for the army command and, ulti-
mately, the historian. Nevertheless, João Chagas, Portugal’s
Ambassador in Paris, was told of some censored letters by a
republican officer, and his reaction was one of worry, for political
divisions had not been left behind by the officers: 
On the one hand a group full of faith and enthusiasm; on the other a group of
sceptics, who only see the negative side of things, some monarchists, others
republican of the Camacho variety, for whom Portugal’s intervention in the
war is the work of the Democrats and therefore odious. 
The soldiers’ letters, Chagas was told, revealed optimism despite
the cold initially felt after the arrival in France.70
The continuation of political feuds — so damaging to morale —
was also reflected in an army information report sent to Lisbon in
1917, based on the observations of a ‘capable’ source.71 This
report is a long list of motives for concern. At the very top, dis-
agreement between the commanders of the two divisions over the
nature of relations to enjoy with the British forces; elsewhere,
open contempt by the soldiers and junior officers for officers
from the General Staff, who rarely if ever visited the front; who,
it was claimed, protected monarchist officers; who abused their
privileges — such as use of automobiles; and who, lastly, were
terribly incompetent, ordering the execution of impossible 
tactical actions against the enemy. Soldiers had written a song —
the Hino dos Caxapins, which ridiculed these General Staff 
officers, regarded as shirkers and cowards — which they sang
whenever a staff officer appeared in the trenches. The report
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went on, highlighting the material deficiencies of the health 
services (which, it claimed, also discriminated against known
republicans, leaving them to wait for a day before attending
them), the danger posed by chaplains (‘constant and odious
spreaders of pro-restoration propaganda and true instruments of
calumny against the Republic’s men’), and the problems caused
by the lack of an independent Portuguese air force. Also selected
as a target were the officers engaged in the censorship of corre-
spondence, whose lack of secrecy was affecting morale through
the publicization of personal matters, and the legation in Paris.
João Chagas, according to report, had fallen prey to a complete
apathy. The outlook was far from good for the Republic: 
The restoration of the monarchy is viewed as a fact that, under German pro-
tection, will follow immediately from the cessation of hostilities between
Portugal and the central empires; all Portuguese troops should surrender to
Germany in order to be repatriated at a later date. This is the propaganda
spread by the germanophiles, the monarchists, and above all the priests among
the soldiers, ignorant and abandoned by their superior officers.72
The report, whatever its accuracy, is useful because the picture it
portrays — of an army on the brink of mass surrender — is taken
sufficiently seriously by the Army’s intelligence service to be
passed on to Lisbon. In other words, the report shows the extent
to which distrust of the monarchists still present in the officer
corps ran — and begs the question of why such an army was sent
to the battlefield in the first place.
The decision to send an Expeditionary Corps to France was the
expected response from the leading Portuguese parties to the
state of war with Germany, a condition they had sought for
Portugal since August 1914. The presence of the CEP in France
was meant to symbolize the resurgence of Portugal and the 
credibility of the new republican regime: it was intended to better
Portugal’s standing with the democracies of Europe — thereby
ensuring the survival of its colonial empire — and to strengthen
the Republic’s hold on the country. The practical results were
quite the opposite. Awareness of Portugal’s military effort
remained low in Allied countries, and what testimony survived of
the CEP is anything but flattering; a drop in the ocean of the
Western Front, it would never be able to achieve a victory merely
on its merits — and of course it was destroyed as a fighting unit 
on 9 April 1918. Worse still were the effects on the Republic’s
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credibility: military defeat in East Africa at the hands of the
German General Von Lettow; the Republic’s legitimate govern-
ment toppled only for Sidónio Pais, the usurping President, to
receive universal praise from the Allies, despite his clear policy
of not sending more troops to France; the shame of two different
negotiating teams at Versailles — the necessary result of Sidónio
Pais’s murder and the subsequent bout of civil war in the
country. The soldiers of the CEP, more than anyone else, paid
the price for this policy, enduring the experience of trench war-
fare without any signs of widespread support at home for their
actions in France. A politically divided and largely apathetic 
officer corps was unable to compensate for this situation, failing
even to ensure that the level of comfort and supply of its troops
was the same as that of the other Allies. These failures are clearly
reflected in the soldiers’ correspondence, which reveals the 
soldiers’ indignation over the duality in leave criteria and the
harsh circumstances in which they had to survive, especially after
the Lys battle.
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